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Independent Cities and Counties in Virginia: Substitute Jurisdictions?

Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, USA, gturnbull{at}gsu.edu

Michael T. Tasto

Department of Economics and Finance, Southern New Hampshire University, 2500 North River Road, Manchester, New Hampshire 03106, USA, m.tasto{at}snhu.edu

Cities and counties are overlapping jurisdictions in most US states. Virginia cities, however, are independent of counties, with separate tax bases and residents. This paper examines whether the Virginia system creates a horizontal relationship resembling that among cities in other states. It uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns against competitive median voter benchmarks. The results show that cities and counties in metropolitan areas function like horizontal rivals in the Virginia system, in contrast with the vertical relationship imposed by the overlapping jurisdiction structure in other states.

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Urban Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1, 53-66 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0042098007085101


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This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Turnbull, G. K. Articles by Tasto, M. T. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?