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Urban Studies, Vol. 36, No. 11, 1875-1889 (1999)
DOI: 10.1080/0042098992656
© 1999 Urban Studies Journal Limited

Needs-based Targeting without Knowing Household Incomes: How Would it Work in Russia?

Raymond Struyk

Urban Institute-TPN, VI Jokai u.34, H-1065 Budapest, Hungary, tpn{at}mail.matav.hu

Anastasia Kolodeznikova

Institute for Urban Economics (Moscow), akolodez{at}chat.ru

Proxy means tests are often suggested for use in countries where tighter targeting of benefits of social programmes are desired but verification of household incomes is difficult. This paper reports on simulations of the use of two types of proxy means test in determining eligibility for Russia's housing allowance programme and the payments which eligible households would receive. Based on 1995 and 1996 survey data, tests are reported for three cities: Vladimir, Moscow and Gorodetz. The results consistently show that the proxy procedures introduce substantial errors into who is admitted to the programme. Most disturbing is the large share of eligible households who would be denied benefits using the first proxy (predicted income used for eligibility determination)—10-30 per cent. The average benefit loss for the poorest quintile of households falsely denied benefits is equivalent to about 20 per cent of their incomes. Under the alternative procedure based on demographic characteristics, errors are smaller than under the first procedure for pensioners and large families but much greater for lone mothers. But even for the first two groups, undercoverage runs at about 15 per cent. On balance, these results suggest that very great caution should be used in proposing proxy income tests of the type analysed here in the countries of the former Soviet bloc for means-tested programmes in general.


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